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WEST VIRGINIA LAW QUARTERLY
obligation. Had the subscriber not intended to be legally bound,
there would have been neither an occasion for, nor point in, reciting
a consideration. It therefore appears that the subscription does
show plainly on its face- albeit not as an express statement-
the purpose to become legally bound. The clause of qualification
in the syllabus, not adverted to in the text of the decision, follows
closely the language of the Uniform Written Obligations Act,19
which has not been adopted by the West Virginia legislature. Does
the syllabus state the law?' If so, it is arguable that the court
has gone far toward adopting the rule pronounced by the Act,
without action by the legislature.
From an examination of the case, it seems that the charitable
subscription was held unenforceable because under the pleadings
and evidence the facts did not fall within the scope of the possible
approaches suggested. It is not clear that in a proper case an
opposite result might not obtain, predicated either upon a common-
law consideration, or upon the doctrine of promissory estoppel.
The decision cannot properly be considered an absolute rejection
of the enforceability of charitable subscriptions.
It is suggested that the problem of enforceability of charitable
subscriptions might best be resolved by wise legislation designed
both to protect the primary source of income of charitable insti-
tutions, and to preserve from further effacement the orthodox
principles of consideration.
K. J. V.
NEGLIGENCE - RAILROADS - DUTY OWING TRESPASSERS AND
LICENsEE - EFFECT OF EXCEEDING LICENCE. - P's decedent, while
sitting or lying on D's railroad track in an intoxicated and uncon-
scious condition, was struck and killed, at a point commonly used
by pedestrians, by D's coal train as it slowly backed around a
reverse curve. The lookout maintained by the conductor and brake-
man failed to reveal in time the decedent's peril. On appeal from
19 Uniform Written Obligations Act, § 1, quoted in 1 WILLISTON, CONTRACTS
§ 219A as follows: "A written release or promise hereafter made and signed
by the person releasing or promising shall not be invalid or unenforceable for
lack of consideration, if the writing also contains an additional express state-
ment, in any form of language, that the signer intends to be legally bound."
This section is intended to remedy the gap in the law of jurisdictions where
by statute the common-law effect of the seal is abolished.2 Hardman, "The Law - in West Virginia (1940) 47 W. VA. L. Q. 23;
"The Syllabus Is The Law" (1941) 47 W. VA. L. Q. 141; "The Syllabus Is
The Law" - Another Word (1941) 47 W. VA. L. Q. 209.
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RECENT CASE COMMENTS
a judgment for P, held, one judge dissenting, that P had failed to
show any breach of duty owing the decedent, and that decedent be-
came a trespasser when he exceeded his license. Connelly v. Vir-
ginian Railroad Co.1
The West Virginia court' follows the generally accepted rule
that there is no affirmative duty of care owing a trespasser until
after discovery. 3 As to the duty owing the bare licensee or the
"constant trespasser over a limited area' ', 4 there is considerable
uncertainty in the West Virginia decisions. Numerous West Vir-
ginia cases have followed the rule that the railroad owes them no
other or higher duty than it owes to trespassers, namely, to use
reasonable care to avoid injuring them after they have been dis-
covered in a place of dangers In a number of these cases, however,
there does not seem to be sufficient evidence that the public used
the tracks to such an extent as to make the injured person a
licensee.8 But in line with the present tendency to show greater
regard for human safety, our court has indicated in several cases
that a railroad company is under a duty to exercise greater care
for the protection of the licensee than of the trespasser.7  This view
is expressed in the instant case as follows: "For the purposes of this
case, the defendant undoubtedly was required in the location of
the accident to maintain a reasonable lookout for that class of
pedestrians. By acquiescing in their use of its exclusive right of
way, it owed them, as distinguished from trespassers, that duty."
This view has the support of modern text authorities and of the
Restatement of Torts.8
The determination of the status of the decedent as licensee or
trespasser was made unnecessary by the court's finding that as a
matter of law there was no breach of duty as to either. This
120 S. E. (2d) 885 (W. Va. 1942), Riley, J., dissenting.
2 Ballard v. Charleston Interurban Ry., 113 W. Va. 660, 169 S. E. 524 (1933) ;
Hough v. Monongahela W. P. P. S. Co., 117 W. Va. 272, 185 S. E. 769 (1936) ;
Jones v. Virginian Ry., 116 W. Va. 201, 179 S. E. 71 (1935).3 Northern Alabama Ry. v. Elliott, 219 Ala. 423, 122 So. 402 (1929); Smith-
wick v. Pacific Electric Ry., 206 Cal. 291, 274 Pac. 980 (1929); Young v.
South Georgia Ry., 34 Ga. App. 537, 130 S. E. 542 (1926).
4 RESTATEMENT, TORTS (1934) § 334.5 Blagg v. Baltimore & Ohio B. B., 83 W. Va. 449, 98 S. E. 526 (1919);
Robertson v. Coal & Coke By., 87 W. Va. 106, 104 S. E. 615 (1920); Tomp-
kins v. Sunday Creek Co., 68 W. Va. 483, 69 S. E. 980 (1910).
6 Huff v. Chesapeake &'Ohio Ry., 48 W. Va. 45, 35 S. E. 866 (1900) ; Spicer
v. Chesapeake & Ohio By., 34 W. Va. 514, 12 S. E. 553 (1890).
7 Barron v. Baltimore & Ohio B. B., 116 W. Va. 21, 178 S. E. 277 (1935)';
Melton v. Chespeake & Ohio By., 71 W. Va. 701, 78 S. E. 369 (1913).
SHARPER, TORTS (1933) § 95; PRossE, TORTS (1941) § 78; RESTATEMENT,
TORTS § 334.
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WEST VIRGINIA LAW QUARTERLY
likewise barred the "last clear chance" doctrine as a possible
ground of recovery. The court holds, however, that "An implied
licensee upon the tracks of a railroad company who plainly exceeds
the purpose for which the license has been allowed by the owner
becomes a trespasser." 9  The rule that a licensee who exceeds
his license becomes a trespasser is well settled.10 However, this
seems to be the first time the West Virginia court has applied it
to facts such as appear in the present case. Other courts have made
a similar application of the rule, the Texas court saying: "If the
public had a license to use the tracks as a highway, no license can
be inferred to use the tracks for sleeping purposes.''"
I D. V. B3.
PRINciPA Aim SuRETY - DISCHARGE OF SURETY - NOTICE TO
SUE PRINmAL - SUFFICmNcY OF NOTICE. - S signed, as surety,
a note held by C. A statute provided that after a cause of action
had accrued, "The surety... may. . . require the creditor... by
notice in writing, forthwith to institute suit",' and if the creditor
does not institute suit within a reasonable time after notice, the
surety shall be released.' S sent C the following notice: "... . this
is to notify you to collect his note on which I am endorser . . ."I
Five years later, C brought suit on the note, and S claimed release
under the statute. Held, one judge dissenting, that the notice was
insufficient under the statute. Williams v. Zimmerman.'
Several courts have held a notice "to collect" sufficient under
this type of statute,5 but the majority opinion discounted these
holdings as based either on special urgency expressed in the notice,
or on the special working of the statute itself. At the other ex-
9 Syllabus by the court.
10 Cornett's Adm1r v. Louisville & W. R. R., 181 Ky. 132, 203 S. W. 1054
(1918); Lyons' Adm1r v. Illinois Central R. R., 22 Ky. L. R. 1032, 59 S. W.
507 (1900); Smith v. International & G. N. R., 34 Tex. Civ. App. 209, 78 S. W.
556 (190).
21.1bid.
IW. VA. CODE (Miehie, 1937) c. 45, art. 1, § 1.
2 d at § 2.
3 Williams v. Zimmerman, 20 S. E. (2d) 785, 786 (W. Va. 1942). Italics ours.
4 20 S. B. (2d) 785 (W. Va. 1942).
' Franklin v. Franklin, 71 Ind. 573 (1880); liff v. Weymouth, 40 Ohio St.
101 (1883); Strickler v. Burkholder, 47 Pa. 476 (1864); Sullivan v. Dwyer, 42
S. W. 355 (Tex. Civ. App. 1897). Cf. Benge's Adm'r v. Eversole, 156 Ky. 131,
160 S. W. 911 (1913) and Baker v. Whittaker, 177 Ky. 197, 197 S. W. 644
(1917).
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